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COMPONENT MANAGEMENT

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

General 1
The direct cost of physicians in the current health care delivery system
in this country is amazingly small. Physicians take home (in salary and
other direct compensation) less than 14 percent of the total health care
dollar. In fact, the direct cost of doctors' paychecks is slightly less than
the total cost of administrative expenses in hospitals and physician
offices, and about equal to the average cost of insurance company
administration.
In other words, doctors' salaries are not, in themselves, a major part of
the health care cost problem. However, the critical point to understand
relative to the cost impact of physicians is that decisions made by
doctors control over 90 percent of the health care costs in this country.
Physicians prescribe drugs and determine whether a patient is
hospitalized. They determine whether a patient is sent to a nursing
home or treated on an outpatient basis.
Doctors determine the
procedures a given patient will receive and where those procedures will
be delivered. Physicians determine the scope, complexity, and direction
of care. Most non-physician care cannot legally be provided without a
physician's explicit approval and oversight.
In other words, the role of the physician is central to the issue of health
care costs, but the direct income received by physicians is · not the
primary factor that creates today's health care expense level.
Hypothetically, physicians could be paid twice as much as they receive
now, and if they were 50 percent more efficient at all of the nonphysician services that they prescribe, the total cost of health care
would drop by more than 25 percent.
Given the preceding facts, a couple of key questions emerge: ( 1) What
is the appropriate role of physicians in the new world of accountable
health plans and care-system-based health services delivery? (2) If one .
assumes that health care will be increasingly delivered through teams of
providers who are prepaid (and therefore, pre-budgeted) for all of the
care they will provide, what will be the role of the physician on those
care teams?
Clearly, the care teams will not be successful unless physicians make
cost-effective decisions regarding the 90-plus percent of care delivery
that they control. The prepaid care teams of the mid-1 990s need to be

structured in ways that enable, encourage, and reward physicians
relative to the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and quality of their care
decisions or the care teams will fail.
Physicians support for, and
leadership of, the new care teams will be critical to their success.
However, the new results-based reimbursement system will represent a
significant departure from current physician reimbursemen!_approaches,
in which physicians tend to be rewarded on a piecework basis as
individual profit centers and not as elements of an overall team of care
givers. In the current setting, neither the quality nor efficiency of care
is rewarded. Traditional fee-for-service payment approaches create
direct financial incentives for physicians to maximize the volume and
complexity in the care they deliver, whether or not that volume and
complexity of care has positive results for the patient. There is no
linkage between either efficiency or quality of the fees that physicians
are now paid. There are tens of thousands of billing codes in U.S.
insurance payment approaches for procedures and units of care, but
there is not one single billing code for a cure! There are no financial
rewards for positive health care outcomes or improved health. The
doctor, in fact, usually gets paid more money if patients don't recover
quickly (because more procedures are needed)then if they do. the profit
motive clearly has an impact on any economic system, and the
incentives created by our current fee-for-service health insurance system
reward and encourage inefficiencies and unnecessary care.
Physicians tend to be bright, decisive people who base their decisions on
the best information available to them. They behave like that in their
practices, and they tend to follow those same behavior patterns in nonmedical areas of their careers and business relationships. Unfortunately,
the information now readily available to physicians about non-medical,
health marketplace issues tends to be incomplete and often highly
distorted.
The decisions made by physicians as a result of that
inaccurate information tend to be somewhat flawed.
The key to persuading physicians to participate in the most positive way
in an accountable care system is to give them the most complete,
candid, and clearly described assessment of the market factors and
economic constraints that will be affecting them for the rest of this
decade, along with the best available information about the benefits to
patient populations of systems-based health care approaches. That
assessment needs to be entirely honest, fact-based, and real. Issues
should not be sugar-coated, because decisions made based on falsely
optimistic beliefs will lead to strategies and relationships that are
terminally naive and doomed to fail.
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Also, the credibility of the accountable health plan organizers will suffer
and their effectiveness will be damaged if the physicians learn or even
strongly suspect that they have been told less than the full truth about
the emerging health care marketplace and the benefits and implications
of systems-based care. The goal of the accountable health plan ought
to be to create a team of caregivers with commonly aligned incentives,
objectives, and processes. This can't happen if the team_:_s diagnostic
foundation is not based on reality, honesty, and a competent assessment
of the issues.
When physicians have the facts at hand in trusting patients, they make
tough, competent, and accurate medical diagnoses. They will do the
same in their business and care systems relationships when they also
have sufficient facts to consider. Once they make the same market
factor diagnosis that the Accountable Health Plan providers have made,
it's possible to begin to create the kinds of care teams that will be
successful in the brave, new world of accountable health plans.
This is not a painless process. Many physicians do not want to
acknowledge the reality of prepayment and its impact on their incomes
or autonomy. Many will be angered and "in denial" when they first hear
the truth. Many will challenge the concepts and the conclusions with
great vigor. Therefore, it will be critical to accountable health plan
organizers to put complete facts and irrefutable logic on the table.
Accountable health plan organizers must make clear their desire to work
with the doctors to help make their new world as successful as possible.
In today's fee-for-service environment, cost competition between
specialty physicians and high-tech care programs doesn't exist because
insurers and other payers cannot and do not steer patients effectively
from uncooperative and less efficient specialists to more cooperative
care sites. Accountable health plans, however, will be in a much better
position to do exactly that, because the consumers will select the
accountable health plan and the accountable health plan will select the
specialists. The accountable health plans will quickly find it in their own
best interest to send patients to the most efficient and highest quality
specialists, and they will do so as market pressures on cost force
accountable health plans to make these decisions in order to remain both
competitive and financial viable.

B.

Influencing Factors
The Medicare program has significantly influenced the behavior of
physicians since its inception in 1968. A prime example is provision for
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direct billing of the professional component performed by hospital based
physicians. This led to long itemized lists of services that were direct
billed.
Early attempts to do utilization review (late 1 960' s) focused on profiling
each specialty to determine those physicians who had a usage factor per
patient much higher than their peers. Since peer identific2 tion was by
specialty, new knowledge and experience, gained through the use of
statistical techniques, helped to sharpen the focus on component costs
of medical care.
With the advent of price controls and the economic index in the early
1980' s, further incentives for economic gain turned to use instead of
price. As HMOs grew, there was a need to focus on the cost (price) of
components of medical care in order to conduct negotiations with the
different physician specialties.
The above discussion is not intended to say that Medicare was the sole
influence or component management but it was certainly an influence.
C.

Transitioning To The Future
One way to frame care management capabilities would be to think of a
continuum beginning with utilization review and going the future where
disease management seems to be the goal. There are probably goals
beyond disease management, however, given the rate of advances in
technology. The use of new data technology which allows more patient
involvement in care management decisions is an example. It could still
be called disease management but the patient will certainly be more
involved in the future.

II.

OUTCOMES RESEARCH AND PROTOCOLS 1
The medical staff of the future must be self-evaluative and constantly
correcting. As a result, outcomes research will be an important strategic
activity. Demonstrated desirable outcomes will be required of hospitals by
third-party payers and patients. The determinative factor will be outcomes
measures. It will not be enough to rely on status or reputation as substitutes
for quality. As a result, hospitals will require documented desirable outcomes
from physicians.
Outcomes research differs from traditional medical research because it goes
beyond measuring safety and efficacy to examine such issues as cost
effectiveness and quality of life. It measures ultimate outcomes of interest
4

from the patient's viewpoint (such as comfort, mobility, and speed of return to
work) and does not focus solely on traditional clinical measurements or
intermediate indices of response, such as diagnostic tests. Ultimately, it is a
collection of scientifically and methodologically sound data for measuring the
medical effectiveness of different therapeutic interventions. The information
can then be used for outcomes management to improve the overall health
status of a patient population over a long period of time (Conrad_ 1991).
The incentive for clinicians to participate in outcomes management is the
potential for a marked reduction in unexplained variation and uncertainty. The
goal "should be to improve patient outcomes by making physician behavior
more appropriate and based more on evidence and less on habit (Ball 1989)".
Also, clinicians can serve on a committee that tracks patterns and gives
feedback on efficiency and effectiveness.
The guidelines are somewhat controversial, however. There is skepticism
about mixing scientific and financial thinking. Other obstacles to widespread
implementation of guidelines include the "moving target" problem, changing
physician behavior, and potential litigation. The "moving target" problem is a
product of the speed at which medical practice is advancing. By the time one
protocol is widely adopted, a new technology or therapy may have displaced
it. another obstacle is how most effectively to change physician behavior. The
best way to persuade physicians to follow guidelines is not clear. Also,
litigation is an issue. Some fear that adoption of guidelines will increase
physician liability, and decrease autonomy, because physicians will be held
increasingly responsible if they choose not to follow the guidelines. On the
other hand, guidelines could also protect physicians from litigation because
following the guidelines may constitute requisite thoroughness, and thus free
guideline followers from further responsibility.
Other incentives that may contribute to physicians' acknowledging outcomes
research and following guidelines are risk sharing arrangements like the
proposed Health Care Financing Administration's Ambulatory Visit Groups
(A VGs). A VGs would function in a similar way to DRGs. They would provide
one lump sum or an outpatient condition such as congestive heart failure,
regardless of the number of doctor visits or tests. A similar arrangement might
be instituted for big-ticket inpatient items as well. The hospital and the
physicians would receive one sum that would be divided between them. These
kinds of arrangements could popularize systems professing efficiency and
effectiveness. In addition, hospitals may have on-line access to the best
currently available collective wisdom based on medical research by specialized
firms (Kramon 1991 ). Payers may use this resource, so it might be in the
physicians' best interests to do so as well.
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The increasing popularity of guidelines, coupled with the shift of political power
from providers to payers, may force physicians to incorporate guidelines into
their practices. The primary care gatekeeper is at risk of becoming a glorified
technical expert who works on an assembly line of new patients and falling
prey to what Nash ( 1993) calls the White Coat/Blue Collar syndrome.
Ill.

UTILIZATION REVIEW

A.

Barney Tresnowski 2
Utilization review is a thriving industry with 241 free standing
companies. By denying coverage for unnecessary surgery, limiting
hospital stays and trimming use of psychiatric care, these firms have
helped control the health costs of their clients. But UR will become
passe as the health system is reformed, Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association President Bernard Tresnowski claims in an interview with
F&G's Health Business.
UR grates on the nerves of doctors, who rankle at having their medical
decisions second-guessed by the nurses UR firms typically employ.
Tresnowski says that UR has become too meddlesome and, as insurers
become more competitive under health reform, they'll look for more
innovative ways of controlling provider behavior -- including ways that
aren't as annoying to doctors.
Tresnowski sees UR giving way to "physician profiling" -- a system the
Washington, DC Blues Plan began using in 1988. the plan studies health
claims to gauge a doctor's use of resources to treat a case. Doctors
who are high or low users of resources are not asked to join the Blues
network. Those that fall in the middle are chosen and since they meet
the Blues' criteria up front, they basically will be "left alone" once n the
network, said Tresnowski.
Nice theory, but will it work? A DC Blues spokeswoman says that the
insurer is still using traditional UR methods like pre-admission
certification because it makes clients more "comfortable."
But
eventually, the plan is to "find the doctors who practice naturally in a
cost-effective way and let them do their thing," she says. Other Blues
Plans also are experimenting with the profiling system, and San Mateobased lameter is using a physician profiling system to evaluate doctors
at Cincinnati hospitals.
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B.

Utilization Management: A Cornerstone of Managed Care 3

This article reviews several utilization review techniques:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Precertification
Early Discharge Planning
Appropriateness of the Service
Concurrent Review
Retrospective Review

Case management uses specially trained nurse case managers to follow
the patient both in the hospital and home setting. Outpatient costs often
increase as case management succeeds in reducing inpatient costs.
Another tool used by case managers is prior authorization of outpatient
services.
Chart review and physician profiling are also used to determine
appropriateness of care. Drug utilization profiling and specialist profiling
are identification techniques for both under and over utilization. Use of
hospital profiling is also essential.
Information management tools and techniques are also essential in the
conduct of utilization management. The medical director is also central
to the utilization management program. Their primary responsibility is to
see that utilization management does not compromise quality of medical
care.

C.

Growth of the UR lndustry4

Faulkner & Gray estimates the worth of the UR industry to be $11
billion. While the industry has experienced rapid growth many are now
questioning how successful UR has been in reducing health care costs.
Estimates range from 0.5% to 8%.
Physicians have always resented being second-guessed and complain
that UR interferes with their work. To them, it is a lose-lose approach
to managing patient care.
UR firms expect workers' compensation to be their biggest growth area
in the near future. Health costs account for 40% of the workers'
compensation bill.

7

IV.

EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

A.

Congressional Budget Office

5

First, managed care programs, especially health maintenance
organizations (HM Os), provide lower-cost health care that appears to be
generally as good as the care typically provided in the fee-for-service
(FFS) sector. However, the amount by which HMOs reduce per-patient
costs compared with FFS care is often overstated. Some studies do not
adequately control for the typically healthier people who enroll in HMOs
compared with people in the FFS sector, and so the lower costs of care
observed for HMOs reflect the favorable characteristics of the enrolled
population in addition to the cost-reducing effects of the HMO form of
managed care. Further, some studies rely on results from selected
HMOs that are more effective than is typical for HMOs nationwide, so
that reported saving are higher than would be obtained on average for
all HMOs in operation. Finally, some studies compare costs for HMOs
with costs in a fee-for-service sector that lacks any managed care;
because nearly all FFS plans now have some elements of managed care,
the relative advantage of HMOs compared with the current FFS sector
is decreasing.
Recent nationally representative evidence (for 1 989) indicates that the
most effective HMOs can reduce use of services by about 1 2 percent
compared with unmanaged care, or by about 9 percent compared with
the FFS sector, which is a mix of managed and unmanaged care. When ·
the performance of current HMOs (plans with varying levels of
effectiveness) is considered, evidence indicates that they reduce use of
services by an average of about 7 percent compared with unmanaged
care, and by an average of about 4 percent compared with the FFS
sector.
The second major finding is that under certain conditions, the
independent practice association (IPA) form of HMO can be as effective
as group- or staff-model HMOs in providing low-cost care, but the
necessary conditions are not often met. The I PAs that are most likely to
approach the effectiveness of the best group/staff HMOs are selective
about using cost-conscious providers, maintain an effective network for
information and control, place providers at financial risk, and generate a
substantial portion of each provider's patient load.
Many IPAs in the current mix do not have the above characteristics,
however, and do not match group/staff HM Os in effectiveness. Recent
nationally representative evidence indicates that IPAs reduce use of

8

services by an average of about 3 percent compared with unmanaged
care, or by less than 1 percent compared with the FFS sector.
Although HMOs appear to reduce the level of health care costs, there is
no credible evidence that they also reduce the rate at which costs
subsequently increase. The claim that the rate of growth is lower for
HMOs than for FFS plans is based on a comparison of growth in
premiums over the past few years. That evidence, however, is too weak
to support any conclusion about the relative growth of costs for different
types of plans. A valid comparison of costs among plans must look at
total costs, including patients' out-of-pocket costs for services that are
typically covered. Because slower growth of premiums for HMOs in
recent years has been at least partly offset by higher growth in HMO
enrollees' out-of-pocket costs for services, one cannot conclude that
total costs per HMO enrollee have grown less rapidly than costs per
enrollee in FFS plans. In fact, total costs per enrollee may have grown
as rapidly or more rapidly in HMOs than in FFS plans. In the absence of
reliable data on changes in total costs for HMOs compared with those for
FFS plans, the prudent assumption to make is that the rate of growth in
costs is about the same. In any case, a focus on whether or not
managed care reduces the rate at which health care costs grow
subsequent to its initial effect on the level of costs is probably
misplaced, because the two effects are impossible to distinguish
empirically when insurers are continually adopting new elements of
managed care.
Nonetheless, effective forms of managed care might slow the rate of
growth in costs if they were part of a comprehensive restructuring of the
health care system that incorporated strong incentives to compete on the
basis of price and quality. Under such circumstances, managed care
might more consistently eliminate unnecessary or ineffective care.
Further, it might facilitate greater control over the adoption of new costincreasing technology and might encourage the development of costreducing alternatives.
B.

The AMCRA Foundation 6
Recent concerns about the cost savings potential of managed care have
had an important influence on health care policy debate and have led
many to concerns about medical cost in light of budget constraints.
Several examples of these misconceptions are embodied in recent
reports produced by the CBO between June, 1992 and July, 1993. For
example, in the CBO's review of the cost savings literature (CBO
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1992a), the authors asserted that among health maintenance
organizations (HM Os), only staff and group models effectively reduce
costs, while the much more common Independent Practice Associations
(IPAs) model HMOs are credited with no savings. The CBO further
asserted that managed care savings have declined over time and
represent only one-time savings, with costs increasing at roughly the
same rate as national health care costs.
These assertions are, however, not supported by the published evidence,
as the present review demonstrates. The CBO' s literature review on
managed care savings was highly selective, omitting important recent
studies and painting an overly negative picture of evidence reviewed.
The CBO literature review, for example, did not consider seven key
studies utilized in this report to evaluate managed care savings, all of
which are well designed, controlled studies. In fact, few of those who
accept and use the CBO's savings assumptions realize that the CBO's
estimate of HMO savings (staff and group model HMOs, only) were
based exclusively on one study, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment.
An excellent study, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment is, however,
out of date, and based on the experience of only one HMO. When more
recent evidence is considered, it is clear that the CBO' s picture of
managed care savings is outdated and inaccurate. Unfortunately, the
CBO' s assertions have proven to be particularly influential because of the
CBO's direct involvement in the budget process and the CBO's general
reputation for impartial analysis.
By giving stronger weight to studies of recent vintage that controlled for
the possibility of selection bias, this literature review reveals a very
different picture of managed care savings than that of the CBO. In this
report HMOs are shown to have a large and consistent impact on health
care costs and utilization, mainly through substantial reductions in both
admissions and length of stay, while, as expected, ambulatory utilization
generally increased. The net effect is a strong reduction in overall costs.
Further, contrary to the CBO's contention, there is no evidence that
HMO savings differ substantially by model type. Substantial IPA model
savings were demonstrated through a variety of high quality studies. In
a Medicare study that directly compared savings by model type, staff
model HMOs utilized more resources than IPA and group model HMOs
for physician services, nursing home days, and home health visits. Only
in the utilization of skilled nursing facilities relative to group model HM Os
did IPA model HMOs have higher utilization.
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There is less certainty regarding the specific magnitudes of HMO
savings, as it is difficult to quantify general savings rates from the many
bits of evidence available. However, taken as a whole, the results show
substantially higher savings rates than the CBO's reviews would
suggest. The present review concludes that, on average, HMOs achieve
savings of 27. 1 % beyond traditional fee-for-service plans. This average
savings rate is based on component savings ranging from decreases in
hospital admissions of 34% and hospital length of stay of 16%, to
increases in ambulatory primary care physician utilization of 3.3%. The
increase in physician utilization is the result of financial incentives to the
HMO patient to increase primary and preventive care visits, as well as
the result of provider decisions involving the substitution of less
expensive ambulatory care for more expensive modes of care. The net
effect of the inpatient and outpatient impacts is a substantial decrease
in costs.
On the other hand, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) cannot be
shown to achieve significant savings. Individual studies demonstrated
both savings and cost increases for PPOs. There is anecdotal evidence
that the more advanced PPOs--those that resemble IPA HMOs in certain
features--are probably able to exert a significant measure of cost control.
However, the absence of evidence regarding the relative predominance
of these plans, and the lack of consistent savings evidence from
controlled studies makes it impossible for this review to credit PPOs with
savings. This analysis, however, only considers utilization effects of
these plans and ignores the impact of discounts, which may result in
substantial savings.
While the results for point of service (POS) plans are less conclusive, the
one available study suggests that these forms of managed care, which
share certain features of both HMOs and PPOs, can also be effective.
POS plans are presumed to achieve an average savings rate of 13.2%.
For the population not yet enrolled in HMOs, there is an additional, or
net, reduction in national health expenditures of $81.4 billion. In other
words, savings in addition to those already being achieved for those
enrolled in some form of managed care. This represents a net savings
of 12.2%, and a reduction in national health expenditures as a percent .
of GDP from 12.1 % to 10.6%. When the CBO, in its August 1992
report, identified national savings of 9.6%, it relied on the erroneous
assumption that IPA model HMOs and POS plans did not save money.
This increased their savings result, since by excluding savings for those
currently in IPAs and POS plans, they netted out less current savings.
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For comparison purposes, adopting this same assumption for the present
calculations increases the savings in national health expenditures to
13.6%.
These calculations, however, are not intended as "projections" of the
savings that can be achieved under any specific reform proposal. The
reason is that these calculations are far too conservative in their practical
assumptions regarding potential savings. The savings that can actually
be achieved may far exceed those presented here. This analysis does
not incorporate many of the fundamental market changes that could
dramatically increase the effectiveness of managed care, such as
reducing or eliminating cost-shifting, shadow pricing, or selection bias,
or providing market environments in which managed care plans are
forced to compete vigorously. In addition, this entire analysis excludes
consideration of discounts, which could be expected to have a
substantial impact on national health expenditures.
The main value of extending the savings rates to the national health
accounts is to provide a baseline, or minimum, level of national savings
that results from applying the savings rates derived from the literature to
the nation as a whole. It also helps to illustrate the degree of bias in the
CBO model. Even using stringently conservative assumptions, these
calculations result in larger savings than the CBO' s model.
In addition to single-year savings, this study also calculated the long
term savings that would result from a reduction in the health care cost
trend. The calculation is based on an assumed 11 % reduction in the
health care cost trend. This reduction is based on the differential
between HMO and fee-for-service premium growth rates derived from
employer surveys conducted by the Health Insurance Association of
American (HIAA) and KPMG Peat Marwick. This modest reduction in the
cost trend results in savings of 16.5% by the year 2000 and 22.6% by
the year 2010 (using 1995 as the base year).
These represent
reductions in national health expenditures as a percent of GDP from
18.1 % (based on HCFA projections) to 15.5% of GDP in the year 2000,
and from 22.6% to 17.9% of GDP in 2010.
Even under these conservative assumptions, managed care could exert
significant control on health expenditures well into the future. Using
these assumptions, projected health expenditures as a percentage of
GDP in the year 2000 (15.5%) would be just under HCFA's projections
at the current trend for 1995 (15.6%).
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This evidence suggests that researchers must be willing to challenge old
assumptions regarding managed care and that substantial new research
is needed to update our current understanding of managed care,
especially as the distinctions among the various types of managed care
organizations become increasingly blurred. Future research efforts
should focus on understanding the managed care mechanisms that work,
and on what combinations are most effective, rather than o_n the savings
associated with discreet organizational forms of managed care.
The most immediate and critical implication of this report, however, is
that the CBO, Congress, the Administration, and the health care policy
community must give serious reconsideration to the fundamental
assumptions about the managed care savings that are at the heart of the
analyses and projections guiding the imminent, fundamental redesign of
the U.S. health care system.

V.

SUMMARY OF COMPONENT MANAGEMENT7
APPROACH
•
•

Break out health care costs by component (e.g., hospital, drugs,
physician)
Manage price and volume for each

MECHANISMS
Achieve price discounts through volume
•
Measure price and quality through benchmarking
•
Negotiate contracts on volume and price discount links
•
Direct patient flow
Reduce utilization where unnecessary through utilization review (UR)
•
Establish acceptable norms (e.g., drug formulary, treatment protocols,
preadmission certification guidelines)
Measure deviations from norms
•
•
Create feedback and accountability, (e.g., deny unnecessary surgeries,
limit hospital stays, trim psychiatric care)
•
Can take the form of prospective review (precertification), concurrent
review, and retrospective review
KEY ENABLING CAPABILITY
•

Information management capabilities - accurate claims dataf information
technology infrastructure, solid data management and analysis
13

TRENDS

UR business has grown and most likely will continue to grow rapidly
•
Estimated > 240 freestanding companies provide UR services to
estimated 770 companies
•
UR industry revenues grew 52% from $19M in 1990 to $39M in 1992
•
Cost savings achieved estimated up to 8 % of health care costs
Diversification drives this growth
•
Blurring of definitions between UR and other aspects of managed care.
Example of diversification include management of data on cost, quality
and utilization, worker's compensation, mental health services, and
research
•
Pharmacy benefit management carve-outs, mental health management
are experiencing significant activity
"Traditional" UR increasingly in disfavor
•
Creates adversarial physician relationship as UR "second guesses"
diagnoses
•
"Traditional UR becoming passe", Bernard Tresnowski, President, BCBS
Association
•
Some criticism that UR does not look at the entire spectrum of care
during a patient's illness. Minimizing the cost of one component of care
may increase the cost of another component of care. One example,
reducing pharmaceutical cost may cause increase in hospital length of
stay.
Alternatives to UR are being discussed throughout the industry
•
Physician profiling - to measure a physician's use of resources in order
to evaluate participation/inclusion in a network or to evaluate
performance
•
Disease management - evaluate health care cost across treatment for a
disease instead of by component of care.
Some traditional UR
companies are exploring disease management opportunities as they
attempt to evolve from component management to healthcare
management.
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